On the Objective of Corporate Boards: Theory and Evidence by Illoong Kwon et al.
On the Objective of Corporate Boards:
Theory and Evidence∗
Katherine Guthrie†
katherine.guthrie@mason.wm.edu
College of William and Mary
Illoong Kwon
ilkwon@albany.edu
SUNY-Albany
Jan Sokolowsky
jansoko@umich.edu
University of Michigan
December 21, 2008
Abstract
We develop a principal-agent model linking CEO incentive pay to overstate-
ments that allows us to diﬀerentiate between boards that prevent and boards
that encourage overstatements. Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as an
exogenous increase in the cost of overstatements, we infer from the observed
decrease in CEO incentives that boards must beneﬁt from overstatements. As
predicted by the model, empirical proxies for board beneﬁts from overstatements
are also indicative of higher CEO incentives in the cross-section, and the decrease
in CEO incentives around SOX is concentrated in ﬁrms whose boards are more
likely to beneﬁt from overstatements.
∗We thank Vlado Atanasov, John Boschen, Naomi Feldman, Scott Gibson, Leslie Marx, and John Strong for their
useful comments and suggestions. All errors are ours.
†Corresponding author. P.O. Box 8795, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, USA. Email address: kather-
ine.guthrie@mason.wm.edu; Tel.: +1 757 221 2832; Fax: +1 757 221 2884.
1On the Objective of Corporate Boards:
Theory and Evidence
December 21, 2008
Abstract
We develop a principal-agent model linking CEO incentive pay to overstate-
ments that allows us to diﬀerentiate between boards that prevent and boards
that encourage overstatements. Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as an
exogenous increase in the cost of overstatements, we infer from the observed
decrease in CEO incentives that boards must beneﬁt from overstatements. As
predicted by the model, empirical proxies for board beneﬁts from overstatements
are also indicative of higher CEO incentives in the cross-section, and the decrease
in CEO incentives around SOX is concentrated in ﬁrms whose boards are more
likely to beneﬁt from overstatements.
1CEO incentives have been linked to income-increasing accrual choices, earnings reports
that systematically exceed analysts’ forecasts, earnings restatements, consecutive strings of
earnings increases, and securities class action law suits for ﬁnancial misrepresentation.1 In
an eﬀort to improve the quality of ﬁnancial reporting, recent corporate governance reforms
have put great emphasis on board and committee independence. The view behind these
reforms is that independent boards act as monitors to constrain managers from enriching
themselves at the expense of shareholders (early proponents are Fama (1980) and Fama and
Jensen (1983)).
In contrast to the view that boards act as monitors, several arguments have been put
forth in the theoretical literature for why boards, even the independent ones, may beneﬁt
from inﬂated share prices.2 For example, Dye (1988) cites accounting based contracts
with suppliers, debt covenants, and rate-of-return regulations as motivations for earnings
overstatements. Shleifer (2004) argues that shareholders beneﬁt from attracting external
ﬁnance at lower cost or selling shares at inﬂated prices. In this view, boards may beneﬁt
from overstatements and encourage managers to inﬂate market values. If inﬂating earnings
is a valuable skill on the part of corporate managers, then we would expect it to be reﬂected
in CEOs’ contracts.
To diﬀerentiate between these two opposing views on the boards’ underlying preference
for earnings overstatements, we develop a novel test based on predictions derived from a
principal-agent model linking pay and the cost of overstatements. We show that when
the agent’s cost of overstatement increases, the change in the optimal pay-for-performance
sensitivity (PPS) for a CEO depends on the board’s preference. Speciﬁcally, if the board max-
imizes the fundamental value of a company (i.e. boards do not beneﬁt from overstatements),
1For examples, see Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Denis, Hanouna, and Sarin (2006), Efendi, Srivastava, and
Swanson (2007), Kadan and Yang (2004), Cheng and Warﬁeld (2005), Burns and Kedia (2006), Ke (2004), and Peng
and R¨ oll (2007).
2Boards can beneﬁt directly by retaining their position on the board or through stock ownership, or indirectly as
representatives of current shareholders.
2an increase in the cost of overstatement leads to larger pay-for-performance sensitivity to
induce more productive eﬀort. However, when the board maximizes the market value (i.e.
boards beneﬁt from overstatements), optimal pay-for-performance sensitivity decreases as it
is more costly to induce overstatement.3
To infer board objectives from observed changes in pay-for-performance sensitivities,
we exploit the increase in CEOs’ expected cost of overstatement with the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). SOX increased the cost to CEOs for overstating earnings
by (i) increasing the limits on ﬁnancial penalties and prison terms for ﬁnancial misrepresen-
tation; (ii) requiring CEOs to reimburse any incentive based compensation or proﬁt from
the sale of stock received within 12 months after the misreporting if there is an accounting
restatement as a result of misconduct; (iii) providing an additional $776 million in funding to
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to step up its monitoring and enforcement
eﬀorts; and numerous other provisions.
The beneﬁt of using SOX as an exogenous shock to ﬁrms’ optimal incentive contracts
is that it allows us to compare incentives within ﬁrms over time. Thus, we do not need
to rely on cross-sectional variation to draw inferences about board objectives, as board
objectives likely diﬀer across ﬁrms in unobservable ways. We ﬁnd that pay-for-performance
sensitivity decreases signiﬁcantly in the ﬁscal year of and after SOX, but not in other years.
In particular, we estimate that incentives fall by 8% (or about $23,000 per 1% change in
ﬁrm value at the median and $110,000 at the mean) from before to after SOX.
3We do not speak to the eﬃciency of overstatements. On the one hand, earnings overstatements can distort
investment decisions. If ﬁrms appear more proﬁtable than they are, managers invest in insuﬃciently proﬁtable
projects to mimic investment and employment of truly proﬁtable ﬁrms (as documented in Kedia and Philippon
(2007), for example). On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) argue that short-term arbitrage being cheaper
than long-term arbitrage leads to ﬁrms focusing on short-term assets to avoid prolonged underpricing. That is,
ﬁrms may avoid long-term investments with positive net present values, because of fear of underpricing. Therefore,
boards who set contracts that encourage CEOs to avoid underpricing (i.e. by inﬂating earnings) may in fact alleviate
underinvestment in long-term assets.
3The drawback to relying on SOX for identiﬁcation is that contemporaneous events can
also aﬀect optimal incentives. For example, the NYSE and NASDAQ revised their listing
standards to require independent boards following SOX. However, we ﬁnd that the results are
qualitatively the same if we restrict our tests to companies that were already in compliance
with the new standards before SOX. This suggests that the decrease in incentives is not
driven by recent governance reforms. Our results are also robust to changes in the sample
window, to alternative measures of CEO incentives, and to estimating median eﬀects instead
of mean eﬀects.
To substantiate our ﬁnding that board objectives are reﬂected in CEO incentives, our
second approach relies on empirical proxies for board beneﬁts from overstatements (BBO).
Our model makes two predictions in this regard. First, greater beneﬁts from overstatements
should lead to higher CEO incentives. Second, CEO incentives should fall by more around
SOX in ﬁrms whose boards beneﬁt more from overstatements. To test these predictions,
we use three proxies for board beneﬁts from overstatements: (i) the Kaplan-Zingales (1997)
measure of capital constraint (overstatements temporarily reduce the cost of capital); (ii)
the anti-takeover score of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) (overstatements reduce the
probability of becoming a takeover target); and (iii) the portfolio turnover rate of ﬁrms’
institutional blockholders (overstatements increase the return to inﬂuential short-term in-
vestors).
We ﬁnd strong support for the model’s predictions. Higher capital constraints, fewer
anti-takeover provisions, and higher portfolio turnover rates are indicative of higher CEO
incentives cross-sectionally. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of each measure
corresponds to diﬀerences in CEO incentives of 34%, 15%, and 18%. We also ﬁnd that
the decrease in CEO incentives is concentrated in ﬁrms whose boards are most likely to
beneﬁt from overstatements. This diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach implicitly controls for
4confounding events or changes in market conditions that aﬀect ﬁrms with high and low
board beneﬁts from overstatements equally.
To summarize, we provide a novel test of board objectives with implications for corporate
governance, the provision of incentives, and public policy. Taken together, our results suggest
that both costs and beneﬁts of overstatements are reﬂected in CEO contracts through pay
for performance. Our results are consistent with those found in the literature linking CEO
incentives to earnings management, but challenge the majority view that overstatements are
an unintended consequence of inducing productive eﬀort.
Our paper makes two additional contributions to the corporate governance literature. To
the best of our knowledge, our model is the ﬁrst to derive empirically testable implications on
boards’ objectives. The key point in the theoretical model is the tradeoﬀ between inducing
overstatement and inducing productive eﬀort. Few models have captured this trade-oﬀ
because most of them look at either overstatements or productive eﬀort, but not both.
For example, Stein (1989) and Fischer and Verrecchia (2004) do not consider the agent’s
productive eﬀort or the optimal contract. Holmstr¨ om (1999) and Gibbons and Murphy
(1992) do not consider the agent’s overstatement. And several models that capture this
tradeoﬀ do not consider diﬀerent objectives of the principal. While Crocker and Slemrod
(2005) and Kwon and Yeo (2007) do not model board beneﬁts from overstatements, Dye
(1988), Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) and Goldman and Slezak (2006) do not oﬀer
empirically testable implications to distinguish between boards that discourage and boards
that encourage overstatements.
Second, our revealed-preference-approach to uncovering board objectives circumvents the
problem of how to identify earnings overstatements. Researchers disagree whether accruals
(or which accruals) are good proxies for earnings management (for examples see Schipper
(1989), Beneish (2001), Dechow and Dichev (2002), Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005),
and Ball and Shivakumar (2006)). Durtschi and Easton (2005) criticize the use of forecast
5errors as evidence of earnings management. Other measures of overstatements, such as
shareholder litigation, earnings restatements, and enforcement actions by the SEC suﬀer
from the drawback that only a fraction of overstatements is detected (for examples, see
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), Wang (2004), Burns and Kedia (2006), and Peng and
R¨ oll (2007)). It is also unclear where to draw the line between desired and undesired earnings
management, because the cost of overstatement increases with its magnitude. Boards should
therefore be inclined to constrain management from violating GAAP for relatively minor
beneﬁts (such as a typical equity oﬀering), but not if the survival of the company is at
stake (e.g. Enron and WorldCom). Our research design has the advantage that, unlike
the aforementioned studies, we infer boards’ underlying objectives from the observed CEO
contracts without relying on a proxy for earnings management.
I. Theoretical Model
A. Set-up
We consider a ﬁrm with one principal (e.g. a board) and one agent (e.g. a CEO).4 The agent
exerts productive eﬀort (a) to increase a ﬁrm’s underlying fundamental value, yt = a + ,
where  follows a normal distribution N(0,σ2
). As in Kwon and Yeo (2007), we allow the
agent to overstate the fundamental value by m, and report the overstated performance,
yr = yt + m + m, where m is a random noise following a normal distribution N(0,2
m).5
Both the principal and the market observe only the reported performance yr. Neither
one observes the fundamental value (yt) or overstatement (m). However, the market can
4Throughout the paper, we ignore the possible agency problem between the shareholders and the board. Allowing
such agency problem in this model would be an interesting topic for future research.
5In this paper, we do not consider the agent’s incentive to understate performance to smooth income, for example.
If there is such an incentive, we can regard m as the overstatement above and beyond the understated performance.
6discount the reported value by its expectation on overstatement (me). Then, a ﬁrm’s market
performance (e.g. stock price), denoted by ym, is determined by ym = yr − me.
As in Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006), we assume that investors have heterogenous
beliefs on the agent’s overstatement, and that the ﬁrm’s market value is determined by
the most optimistic investor (or the smallest expected overstatement). In other words,
investors who value the ﬁrm’s shares most highly hold the long positions. More speciﬁcally,
let us denote an investor i0s expectation on the agent’s overstatement by me
i, where mi is
distributed over [m,m], and m > m > 0. We assume that E[me
i] = m∗, where m∗ is the
agent’s equilibrium overstatement level. Therefore, investors’ expectations are rational on
average. However, Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) show that if short selling is costly,
the market price is determined by the most optimistic belief, me = m.6
Let us deﬁne θ such that me = m = θm∗. Note that 0 < θ < 1, since E[me
i] = m∗ >
m > 0, and the market underestimates the extent of overstatement. If market uncertainty
increases and investors’ beliefs are more dispersed (holding the mean constant), then m (θ)
becomes smaller and the market will underestimate the extent of overstatement by more.
Thus, we can interpret θ as a measure of market uncertainty.
The agent’s wage (w) is contingent on the ﬁrm’s market value.7 In the spirit of Holmstr¨ om
and Milgrom (1992), we assume a linear contract, where w = s+βym.8 As long as the market
underestimates overstatement (i.e. θ < 1), the agent gains from overstatement.
6For example, D’Avolio (2002), Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002), and Jones and Lamont (2002) provide empirical
evidence that it is costly to short sell stocks.
7This assumption reﬂects the usual stock- and option based compensation packages for CEOs. Technically, we
assume that the agent’s reported performance is not veriﬁable. For example, the agent may only know the probability
distribution of the true performance, and can only report the mean of the distribution. Then, the agent is unlikely to
become liable for the report. Technically, this assumption allows us to avoid the revelation mechanism, as discussed
in Dye (1988) and Crocker and Slemrod (2005). Under a revelation mechanism, there is no tradeoﬀ between inducing
overstatements and productive eﬀort.
8For recent attempts to characterize general non-linear contracts, see Crocker and Slemrod (2005) and Hemmer,
Kim, and Verrecchia (2000)
7The principal is risk-neutral, and the agent is risk-averse. Speciﬁcally, the agent’s utility
function is given by U(w,a,m) = −exp−r(w− 1
2a2− km
2 m2), where 1
2a2 is the cost of productive
eﬀort and km
2 m2 captures the cost of overstatement. We assume an increasing marginal cost
of overstatement. This can be justiﬁed either because overstatement is increasingly diﬃcult
to accomplish or because the probability and cost of getting caught are growing increasingly
fast with the amount of overstatement. We normalize the agent’s reservation utility to −1,
and assume that the principal has all the bargaining power.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the principal and the agent sign a binding
wage contract. Then, the agent chooses productive eﬀort (a). After the fundamental value
(yt) is realized, the agent chooses his overstatement level (m) and report (yr). The market
discounts the reported value and determines the market value of the ﬁrm (ym). The agent
then gets paid based on the initial contract.
B. Overstatement and Eﬀort
We solve the model by backward induction. Given the contract and the market’s expectation,
we ﬁrst characterize the agent’s incentive constraints for overstatement (m) and productive
eﬀort (a).
Overstatement Given fundamental value (yt = a + ), the agent solves the following
maximization problem to determine the optimal level of overstatement:
max
m E

−exp(−r(s + βy
m −
1
2
a
2 −
km
2
m
2))

= E

−exp(−r(s + β(y
t + m + m − m
e) −
1
2
a
2 −
km
2
m
2))

⇐⇒ max
m s + β(y
t + m − m
e) −
1
2
a
2 −
km
2
m
2 −
r
2
β
2σ
2
m .
8From the ﬁrst order condition, we obtain the optimal level of overstatement
m
∗(y
t) =
β
km
. (1)
Since the agent’s overstatement level does not depend on the reported value, it is rational
for the market to discount the reported value by a constant. Therefore, in this simple
equilibrium, the agent can take the market expectation (me) as given.9
Eﬀort Given the agent’s optimal overstatement rule in (1), the agent’s optimal choice of
eﬀort solves the following optimization problem:
max
a s + βE(a +  + m
∗(y
t) + m − m
e) −
1
2
a
2 −
km
2
m
∗(y
t)
2 −
r
2
β
2(σ
2
m + σ
2
)
= s + β(a + (1 − θ)
β
km
) −
1
2
a
2 −
km
2
(
β
km
)
2 −
r
2
β
2(σ
2
m + σ
2
) .
When the agent decides on his eﬀort level, both  and m are still random variables. The
ﬁrst order condition yields,
a
∗ = β . (2)
Not surprisingly, if β increases, the agent exerts more productive eﬀort. But from eq. (1), the
agent will also overstate the fundamental value by more, which presents a potential trade-oﬀ
to the principal.
9Kwon and Yeo (2007) show that there is another, more complex equilibrium where market expectation is a strictly
increasing function of reported performance. Such an equilibrium becomes quickly untractable in this paper, but the
qualitative results of this paper should hold in that equilibrium too.
9The agent’s participation constraint must also be binding. That is,
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h
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−r(w− 1
2a2− km
2 m2)
i
= −1
m
s + β(a + (1 − θ)
β
km
) −
1
2
a
2 −
km
2
(
β
km
)
2 −
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2
β
2(σ
2
m + σ
2
) = 0 . (3)
C. The Optimal Contract
We model two opposing views on board objectives: maximization of either the market value
or fundamental value of the ﬁrm. To encompass both views, we assume that the board
maximizes the weighted average of market performance and fundamental performance of
the ﬁrm. We introduce λ to capture the weight the board places on its ﬁrm’s market value
instead of its fundamental value. The principal’s optimization problem is thus given by
max
s,β
E[λy
m + (1 − λ)y
t − w] = a + λ(m − m
e) − (s + β(a + m − m
e)) ,
subject to the incentive constraints (1) and (2), and the participation constraint (3).
Substituting (1), (2), and (3) into the principal’s objective function yields
max
β
β+λ(
β
km
−θ
β
km
)−(−(β(β+(1−θ)
β
km
)−
1
2
β
2−
km
2
(
β
km
)
2−
r
2
β
2(σ
2
m+σ
2
))+β(β+
β
km
−θ
β
km
)) .
The ﬁrst order condition is
1 + λ

1 − θ
km

− (1 +
1
km
+ r(σ
2
m + σ
2
))β = 0 . (4)
This ﬁrst order condition reveals the trade-oﬀ in choosing the optimal pay-for-performance
sensitivity (PPS), β. The marginal beneﬁts of raising β include the increased productive eﬀort
10and the returns from the agent’s overstatement, λ

1−θ
km

. The marginal costs of raising β
include the increased cost of productive eﬀort, overstatement, and risk-premium.
The optimal PPS, β∗, is given by
β
∗ =
1 + λ

1−θ
km

1 + 1
km + r(σ2
m + σ2
)
. (5)
We are interested in how optimal PPS changes in response to an exogenous increase in
the agent’s cost of overstatement, km. The following Proposition states that optimal PPS can
either increase or decrease depending on the principal’s preference (λ) and market uncertainty
(θ).
Proposition 1
(i) If θ ≥
r(σ2
m+σ2
)
1+r(σ2
m+σ2
), then
∂β∗
∂km > 0 regardless of λ .
(ii) If θ <
r(σ2
m+σ2
)
1+r(σ2
m+σ2
), then
∂β∗
∂km < 0 if and only if λ > 1
(1−θ)(1+r(σ2
m+σ2
)) .
Proof. See Appendix A.
One might think that an increase in the agent’s cost of overstatement will reduce PPS.
However, Proposition 1 shows that if market uncertainty is suﬃciently small (i.e. θ is
suﬃciently large), an increase in the agent’s cost of overstatement will increase optimal PPS.
Also, even when the market uncertainty is large, if the principal cares about the fundamental
value of the ﬁrm (i.e. λ is suﬃciently small), optimal PPS will increase too.
Intuitively, suppose that the principal does not want the agent to overstate performance,
either because there is no payoﬀ from overstating (high θ) or because the principal does
not care about market value (low λ). In order to induce the agent’s productive eﬀort, the
principal still has to provide positive PPS and induce overstatements. In this case, if the
agent’s cost of overstatement increases, the agent will reduce overstatements voluntarily, and
the principal can raise PPS to induce more productive eﬀort with less overstatement.
11However, if the principal wants the agent to overstate, because overstating yields high
returns (low θ) and because the principal cares about the market value of the ﬁrm(high λ),
the principal would provide high PPS to induce large overstatements. In this case, as the
agent’s cost of overstatement increases, it becomes more costly for the principal to induce
the agent to inﬂate the market value of the ﬁrm. Thus, the principal would have to reduce
PPS.
These results are signiﬁcant, as they show that we can potentially distinguish between
board objectives of maximizing ﬁrms’ market values and fundamental values. More specif-
ically, when there is an exogenous increase in the agent’s cost of overstatement, if the ﬁrm
increases PPS, it implies either that the ﬁrm cares more about the fundamental value or
that the returns from overstatement are negligible. However, if the ﬁrm decreases PPS, it
would be an indication that the ﬁrm focuses relatively more on the market value, and not
the fundamental value of the ﬁrm.
To the extent that we can ﬁnd empirical measures of λ, we can test the model’s predictions
directly (i.e. without inferring board objectives). In particular, the model predicts:
Proposition 2
(i)
∂β∗
∂λ > 0 .
(ii)
∂2β∗
∂km∂λ < 0 .
Proof. See Appendix A.
When the principal focuses more on the market value, instead of the fundamental value,
the principal wishes to encourage more overstatement by providing larger incentives. Thus,
as λ increases, optimal incentives increase too.
However, exactly when the principal cares more about the market value (i.e. λ is large),
the eﬀect of the increased cost of overstatement (km) becomes even bigger. In other words,
12when the agent’s cost of overstatement increases, optimal incentives in ﬁrms that focus
relatively more on market value will decrease by more (or increase by less) compared to
ﬁrms that focus relatively more on fundamental value.
II. Empirical Analysis
A. Overview
Our empirical analysis consists of three parts. First, we utilize Proposition (1) to infer board
objectives from observed changes in CEO incentives around the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We
argue that SOX increased the cost to the agent for overstating earnings directly by increasing
CEOs’ personal exposure to liability (e.g. through higher expected penalties) and indirectly
by making ﬁnancial misrepresentation more diﬃcult (e.g. through more auditor oversight
and independence).
Speciﬁcally, SOX requires CEOs to reimburse any incentive based compensation or proﬁt
from the sale of stock received within 12 months after the misreporting if there is an
accounting restatement as a result of misconduct (section 304). SOX also grants the SEC
power to permanently bar fraudulent executives from serving as oﬃcers or directors in
the future (section 1105). Maximum criminal penalties for fraud under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 are increased to $5 million and 20 years of prison (section 1106), and
maximum prison terms increase to 25 years for securities fraud and up to 20 years for mail and
wire fraud (sections 807 and 903). In addition, SOX requires CEOs to personally certify the
correctness and completeness of the ﬁnancial statement (section 302), as well as to disclose
any signiﬁcant deﬁciencies and changes in internal controls over ﬁnancial misrepresentation
(section 404). The purpose of these certiﬁcations is to prevent CEOs from hiding behind the
veil of ignorance (Bainbridge (2007)). SOX also institutes stiﬀ penalties for noncompliance
13with the certiﬁcation requirements; they are punishable with up to $5 million in ﬁnes and
20 years in prison (section 906).
Furthermore, the SEC is apportioned an additional $776 million of funding for ﬁscal
year 2003, of which $201 million are intended for higher staﬀ compensation and at least
200 new hires (section 601). To better protect investors, SOX mandates the SEC to review
each ﬁrm’s disclosures at least once every three years (section 408). SOX also makes it
more diﬃcult to misrepresent a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial situation by creating the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (title I); requiring auditor independence (title II); improving
the quality of audit committees through independence (section 301) and ﬁnancial expertise
(section 407); and providing explicit protection of whistleblowers (sections 806 and 1107).
SOX provides a quasi-experimental increase in the cost of overstatements that allows us
to diﬀerentiate between board objectives:
Hypothesis 1 According to Proposition (1), an observed decrease in CEOs’ pay-for-performance
sensitivity in response to SOX is consistent with boards maximizing market values, but
inconsistent with boards maximizing fundamental values (i.e. boards must beneﬁt from over-
statements). On the other hand, if CEO incentives increase in response to SOX, over-
statements are either ineﬀective (i.e. there are no gains) and/or boards do not beneﬁt from
overstatements (i.e. they do not value those gains).
The second and third parts of our empirical analysis are tests of Proposition (2). These
tests are independent from inferred board objectives based on Proposition (1). The model
parameter λ captures the weight boards assign to the market value as opposed to the
fundamental value of the ﬁrm. While λ is not directly observable, we can proxy for λ using
measures of board beneﬁts from overstatements. Our three measures are (i) the Kaplan-
Zingales measure of capital constraint (KZ-score); (ii) the number of anti-takeover provisions
14(AT-score); and (iii) the turnover rate in the portfolios of large institutional shareholders
(IT-score). We discuss these measures in more detail in section C.2..
The model makes the following testable predictions about the relationship between CEO
incentives and board beneﬁts:
Hypothesis 2 According to Proposition 2 (i), higher board beneﬁts from overstatements are
reﬂected in higher CEO incentives.
Hypothesis 3 According to Proposition 2 (ii), higher board beneﬁts from overstatement are
reﬂected in a larger decrease in CEO incentives around SOX.
To test hypothesis (2), we link cross-sectional variation in the proxies for board beneﬁts to
CEO incentives. In addition, using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach around SOX, we test
if incentives fall by more in ﬁrms exposed to high pre-SOX board beneﬁts. This approach
allows us to rule out alternative explanations of the decrease in CEO incentives that aﬀect
boards with high and low beneﬁts from overstatements equally.
B. Sample Description
Our sample covers over 850 large publicly traded ﬁrms with ﬁscal years 1999–2005. We
require annual data on CEO incentives (from Execucomp) and ﬁrm characteristics (from
Compustat). To avoid entry and exit eﬀects, we only keep ﬁrms with CEO incentive data
for all seven years of the sample. However, our results are qualitatively unchanged if we relax
this restriction. Our ﬁndings are also robust to excluding ﬁrms with missing control variables
and to excluding ﬁnancial ﬁrms and utilities. Deﬁnitions of all variables are provided in Table
I (Appendix B describes the calculation of PPS in more detail). Table II, panel A, displays
the means of all variables for each ﬁscal year. Panel B provides further summary statistics
for the pooled cross-section. All nominal values are expressed in December 2006 dollars
(using the BLS CPI for all urban consumers – current series).
15[Insert Table I here.]
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C. Results
C.1. The Change in CEO Incentives Around SOX
Timing of SOX and Changes in CEO Incentive Levels
To infer board objectives from hypothesis (1), we need to determine how CEO incentives
change with the passage of SOX in 2002. Whether ﬁrms had suﬃcient time to react to
SOX in the ﬁscal year of its passage is a priori uncertain. Therefore, we treat ﬁscal year
2002 as the transition year (event year t = 0). Initially, we consider ﬁscal years 1999-2001
as the pre-SOX period (−3 ≤ t ≤ −1) and ﬁscal years 2003-2005 as the post-SOX period
(1 ≤ t ≤ 3).10 To study changes in CEO incentives around SOX, we estimate the regression
incentivesit =
+3 X
t=−2
δtDt + α0 +
k X
j=1
αjXjit + υi + it , (6)
where t denotes the number of years before or after SOX, i denotes ﬁrms, and j denotes
control variables. δ−2–δ+3 are the coeﬃcients of interest. Dt are year dummies, Xjit includes
standard control variables used in the literature on executive compensation, namely market
value of equity, stock price volatility, market-to-book ratio, and leverage as measures of
ﬁrm characteristics; return on assets, ﬁrms’ total shareholder returns, and market returns
as performance controls; as well as CEO tenure, CEO turnover, and CEO option exercises.
10SOX was passed in July 2002 in response to the large corporate scandals in the preceding year (e.g. Enron, Tyco,
Worldcom). We assume that ﬁscal year 2003 falls into the post-SOX period, as its begin date falls between June 2002
and May 2003. To the extent that the expected cost of overstatements increased prior to the adoption of SOX (e.g.
through anticipated regulatory changes or higher scrutiny by investors and enforcement agencies), incentive eﬀects
may already be visible in earlier years.
16υi are ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. We estimate heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at
the ﬁrm level to address serial correlation concerns.
We set Dt = 1 for all ﬁscal years in or after event year t, and equal to zero otherwise.
That is, Dt is not the usual year dummy which captures the cumulative change from the
base year (in our case 1999). Instead, we deﬁne it to capture the marginal change from the
prior year. This deﬁnition allows us to use the t-test for signiﬁcant diﬀerence from zero to
determine if incentives fall or rise from their level in the previous year. To the extent that
incentives adjust slowly (i.e. over several years), we may have to add the coeﬃcients for t ≥ 0
to obtain the full impact of SOX on the level of incentives.
Column 1 in Table III shows the results for CEOs’ pay-for-performance sensitivity as the
dependent variable. Following Core and Guay (2002), we deﬁne PPS as the dollar change in
executives’ stock- and option holdings for a hypothetical one percent change in ﬁrm value.
In column 2, the dependent variable is the PPS-ratio, an alternative measure of incentives
(as used in Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian (2008)).
It scales PPS by the sum of PPS, salary, and bonus. The PPS-ratio measures the importance
of incentive pay that is directly tied to the stock price relative to CEOs’ total compensation.
It also implicitly controls for changes in the level of CEO pay, because the denominator
captures the bulk of annual CEO pay.
[Insert Table III here.]
We make the following three observations. First, we observe that PPS and the PPS-ratio
fall in ﬁscal years 2002 and 2003 by a statistically signiﬁcant amount, but not in other years:
the adjustment begins immediately in the transition year and is completed by the following
year. The empirical evidence thus suggests that ﬁrms adjust CEO incentives around SOX.
Second, the economic magnitude of the adjustment is signiﬁcant. We ﬁnd that log(PPS)
falls by a combined 0.239 over 2002 and 2003, which translates into an average drop in PPS
17of about 21.3% (or about $60,000 per 1% change in ﬁrm value at the median and $294,000
at the mean).11 Similarly, we estimate that the PPS-ratio falls by 5.6 percentage points
around SOX, or by about 20% from its average level in 2001. Third, the adjustment seems
permanent in the sense that it is not reversed in ﬁscal years 2004 and 2005. While we
estimate that log(PPS) increases in 2004 by 0.047 from the previous year, the magnitude of
the increase is not suﬃcient to oﬀset the earlier decrease.
Incentive Levels vs. Flow
One potential drawback to our incentive measure PPS is that it may not only reﬂect optimal
contracting considerations, but also CEOs’ timing of option exercises and stock sales. For
example, if CEOs choose to unwind their holdings of exercisable options following SOX, then
we could mistakenly attribute the decrease in PPS to boards maximizing market values. We
provide three arguments against this alternative explanation. First, as is evident from Table
II, panel A, the option exercise ratio drops sharply in 2003. Fewer exercised options translate
into higher PPS. Second, we include the option exercise ratio as a control variable in our
regressions. As expected, its eﬀect on PPS is negative. Third, we use the equity grant
ratio as an alternative incentive measure that is arguably less aﬀected by CEOs’ choices and
market conditions. The equity grant ratio captures the fraction of annual pay in the form of
stock and option grants, which are more performance sensitive than salary, bonus, and other
pay. Contrary to PPS which measures the stock of incentives, the equity ratio indicates the
performance sensitivity of the ﬂow of pay. The results are presented in column (iii) and
are consistent with the results for PPS. The fall in the level of incentives is mirrored in the
composition of the ﬂow of incentive pay.
11We calculate the percentage change as exp(−0.239) − 1 = 21.3%. We calculate the dollar change by multiplying
the percentage change with the mean and median values of PPS of the sample ﬁrms before SOX.
18Pre-SOX vs. Post-SOX Period
While estimating year dummies sheds light on when the changes in CEO incentives take
hold, the year dummies are not well-suited for interacting with proxies for board beneﬁts
from overstatements, which we do in parts 2 and 3 of our empirical analysis. Thus, for ease
of interpretation and comparison of incentive levels between the pre- and post-SOX periods,
we re-estimate eq. (6), but replace the year dummies with one post-SOX dummy. When
using the post-SOX dummy, we cluster standard errors by ﬁrm-periods to address serial
correlation concerns and to account for the fact that SOX aﬀected the ﬁrms simultaneously.
The results are displayed in Table IV.
[Insert Table IV here.]
For the ﬁrst two columns, we deﬁne ﬁscal years 2002 and later as the post-SOX period,
because CEO incentives start falling in ﬁscal year 2002. As a robustness check, we deﬁne
all ﬁscal years beginning on or after August 1, 2002 as post-SOX years, as SOX was signed
into law on July 30, 2002. The change in the deﬁnition of post-SOX aﬀects a large number
of ﬁrm-years. 840 observations of ﬁscal year 2002 and 61 observations of ﬁscal year 2003
are considered post-SOX in columns 1 and 2, but pre-SOX in colums 3 and 4. The results,
however, are very similar across the deﬁnitions of post-SOX. We estimate that, on average,
log(PPS) falls by about 0.083 and the PPS-ratio by about 0.032 from before to after SOX.
The reason that the deﬁnition of post-SOX does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the results is that
CEO incentive levels in 2002 lie in between those of earlier and later years. Shifting ﬁscal
year 2002 observations from the post- to the pre-SOX period lowers the averages in both
periods, but leaves the diﬀerence largely unaﬀected.
Our estimates of the decrease in CEO incentives based on the post-SOX dummy are
smaller than those based on year dummies. The primary reason is that CEO incentive levels
were relatively low in 1999, which reduces the average incentive level in the pre-SOX period.
19The economic magnitude is still signiﬁcant, with an estimated decrease in PPS by $23,000
per 1% change in ﬁrm value at the median and $110,000 at the mean, especially in light of
average shareholder returns of 16% in our sample (with a standard deviation of 67%).
In further robustness checks we estimate variations of eq. (6) for diﬀerent event windows
(± 1, 2, or 3 years around SOX, including and excluding 2002). While our estimates of
the magnitude of the decrease in CEO incentives vary depending on the size of the event
window, the results are qualitatively unchanged. Since our theory only makes directional
predictions about CEO incentives, and not their magnitude, the choice of the event window
is largely inconsequential.
Representativeness of the Mean Eﬀect
In Tables III and IV, we report results from ﬁrm-ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions that estimate the
mean change in CEO incentives from before to after SOX. To ensure that our results are
representative of the typical ﬁrm in the sample instead of being driven by large changes
in a few ﬁrms, we also estimate median regressions. The results are presented in Table V.
We purge ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects by demeaning all variables.12 The estimated median change in
log(PPS) from before to after SOX is equal to the mean eﬀect, and only slightly smaller for the
PPS-ratio. We conclude that the change in CEO incentives is pervasive and representative
of the typical ﬁrm in our sample.
[Insert Table V here.]
Bonus Pay
Our measures of CEO incentives emphasize CEOs’ wealth gains from stock and option
holdings. In practice, however, other forms of pay, such as bonuses, are also tied to ﬁrm
performance and can thus provide incentives for overstatements. Our ﬁrst measure of the
12First-diﬀerencing instead of demeaning does not materially aﬀect the results.
20level of CEO incentives — log(PPS) — completely ignores CEOs’ bonus compensation.
Although our second measure of CEO incentives — PPS-ratio — includes bonuses, it assumes
that bonuses provide CEOs with fewer incentives to overstate performance than stock- and
option holdings. To rule out the possibility that CEO incentives shifted from PPS to bonus
pay around SOX without aﬀecting the link between total CEO pay and ﬁrm performance,
we take an alternative approach oﬀered in the prior literature on CEO pay to estimate how
the performance-sensitivity of CEO pay has changed around SOX. We regress bonus pay
and total CEO pay on two measures of ﬁrm performance: return on assets and ﬁrm stock
returns. We also interact the performance measures with the post-SOX dummy to allow for
changes in the performance sensitivity of CEO pay:
payit = τ1 performanceit + τ2 D(t ≥ 0)t × performanceit + τ3 D(t ≥ 0)t
+ α0 +
k X
j=1
αjXjit + υi + it , (7)
where D(t ≥ 0)t is a dummy set to one for ﬁscal years 2002–2005. The interaction term
captures whether the link between pay and performance has strengthened or weakened from
before to after SOX. Again, we estimate heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered
at the ﬁrm-period level.
The results are displayed in Table VI. In column 1, we use bonus pay as the dependent
variable. In column 2, we use total CEO pay as the dependent variable, which includes the
ﬂow of compensation (such as salary, bonus, stock and option grants), as well as changes
in the value of CEOs’ stock and option holdings. We use the dollar value of bonus and
total pay (in $ mill.) instead of their logarithmic values, because the dollar amounts are
zero or negative in a non-negligible fraction of observations. To alleviate the concern that
outliers severely aﬀect the magnitude of our estimates, we winsorize the pay and performance
measures at the top and bottom percentile.
21[Insert Table VI here.]
The result for bonus pay conﬁrms that incentive pay has in fact shifted from stocks and
options toward bonus pay. We estimate that bonus pay has increased by $166,000 around
SOX on average. Furthermore, bonus pay does increase with return on assets (accounting
performance) and with ﬁrm stock returns (market performance). Most interestingly, however,
is the ﬁnding that the accounting-performance sensitivity decreases around SOX, while the
market-performance sensitivity of bonus pay increases. This shift towards bonus pay and its
increasing market-performance sensitivity suggest that our earlier results based on log(PPS)
overstate the true decrease in incentives.
Turning to total pay, we ﬁnd that it primarily responds to ﬁrms’ market performance.
The economic magnitude of its performance sensitivity swamps the wealth eﬀects from bonus
pay.13 More importantly, the performance-sensitivity of total pay decreases sharply around
SOX by almost half. We conclude that the declining performance sensitivity of stock and
option holdings outweighs the increasing weight placed on bonus pay and its increasing
market-performance sensitivity.
To summarize, we ﬁnd CEO incentive levels decrease in response to SOX by an eco-
nomically large and statistically highly signiﬁcant amount, which is inconsistent with the
hypothesis that boards discourage overstatements, but consistent with the alternative view
that boards beneﬁt from overstatements.
C.2. CEO Incentives and Board Beneﬁts from Overstatements
We now take a completely independent approach to identify board objectives. In the previous
section, we inferred board objectives from the change in CEO incentives in response to an
13As CEO pay is highly skewed, estimated mean eﬀects are not representative of the typical ﬁrm. Using median
regressions reduces the magnitude of the estimates by factors ranging from 2 to 10, but the qualitative ﬁndings do
not change.
22increase in the cost of overstatements. Here we proxy for unobservable board objectives
and test if they are reﬂected in CEO incentives as predicted by the model. As stated in
hypothesis (2), we expect ﬁrms with higher beneﬁts from overstatements to provide more
incentives. To test this prediction, we build on the following regression equation linking
CEO incentives and board beneﬁts:
incentivesit = ψ1 BBOit + ψ2 D(t ≥ 0)t + α0 +
k X
j=1
αjXjit + υi + it , (8)
where ψ1 is the coeﬃcient of interest and BBOit is the generic label for our proxies for
board beneﬁts from overstatements. As before, D(t ≥ 0)t is the post-SOX dummy and
Xjit includes control variables: market value of equity, stock price volatility, market-to-book
ratio, leverage, ﬁrms’ total shareholder returns, market returns, CEO tenure, CEO turnover,
and CEO option exercises.
Our three measures of board beneﬁts to proxy for board objectives are (i) the Kaplan-
Zingales measure of capital constraint (KZ-score); (ii) the number of anti-takeover provisions
(AT-score); and (iii) the turnover rate in the portfolios of large institutional shareholders
(IT-score). We deﬁne all board beneﬁt proxies such that higher values reﬂect higher beneﬁts
from overstatements.
The KZ-score (as used, for example, in Lamont, Polk, and Sa´ a-R´ equejo (2001), Mal-
mendier and Tate (2005), and Bergman and Jenter (2007)) captures the likelihood of ﬁ-
nancial constraint.14 Financially constrained ﬁrms beneﬁt from overstating performance, as
14In robustness checks, we also use the WW-index (Whited and Wu 2005) to measure ﬁnancial constraints. The
results are robust to using the WW-index in section C.3., but not in section C.2.. In our research setting, the KZ-
index is more desirable for two reasons. First, it is more highly correlated with actual debt and equity issuances in
our sample. We posit that it is this access to capital markets that provides boards with beneﬁts from overstatements.
Second, the main diﬀerence between the KZ- and WW-indexes is that the WW-index includes ﬁrm size (as measured
by total assets) as an indicator of ﬁnancial constraint. However, ﬁrm size directly aﬀects PPS: small ﬁrms are more
ﬁnancially constrained according to WW, but also oﬀer lower PPS (e.g. because the marginal returns of CEO eﬀort
are smaller). Therefore, it is not surprising that we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant link between the WW-index and PPS when
estimating eq. (9). However, when we estimate eq. (10), the direct eﬀect of ﬁrm size in the WW-index on PPS is
cancelled out through the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach.
23it helps them reduce the cost of external ﬁnancing. For example, Teoh, Welch, and Wong
(1998a, 1998b) and Rangan (1998) provide empirical evidence of earnings overstatements
around IPOs and SEOs, and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) document overstatements to
avoid debt-covenant violations.
Similarly, ﬁrms with fewer anti-takeover provisions are exposed to more pressure from
the market for corporate control. This is a standard measure in the literature on corporate
governance (introduced by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and subsequently used, for
example, in Boone, Field, Karpoﬀ, and Raheja (2007)). Overstatements beneﬁt directors
in ﬁrms with few anti-takeover provisions, because they make those ﬁrms less attractive
takeover targets and help directors retain their positions.
The IT-score captures internal pressure from ﬁrms’ investors. Large institutional share-
holders with higher portfolio turnover rates are more likely to value short-term performance
(see Carhart (1997) and Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) for applications). Also, there is
mounting evidence that large shareholders actively inﬂuence management. Carleton, Nelson,
and Weisbach (1998), Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2008), and Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and
Thomas (2008) provide detailed studies of shareholder activism by TIAA-CREF in the US,
the Hermes Fund in the UK, and for a sample of US hedge funds. Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach
(2007) document that blockholders aﬀect numerous corporate outcomes, such as investment
and executive pay. In the same vein, Guthrie and Sokolowsky (2008) show that ﬁrms inﬂate
earnings around seasoned equity oﬀerings by more in the presence of outsider blockholders
than in their absence.
A diﬃculty in estimating eq. (8) is that CEO incentives may reﬂect variation in board
beneﬁts either over time and/or across ﬁrms. The ﬁxed eﬀects estimator, however, utilizes
only within-ﬁrm variation and the between estimator uses only cross-sectional variation.
Applying the random eﬀects estimator to eq. (8) constrains the within-eﬀect to equal the
between-eﬀect. Yet, there is no reason to expect that the diﬀerence in CEO incentives
24between two ﬁrms reﬂecting a one unit diﬀerence in BBO is equal to the change in CEO
incentives within a ﬁrm for a one unit increase in BBO. Furthermore, our BBO measures vary
considerably in their between- and within-variances. For example, the KZ-score exhibits as
much variation in the cross-section as within ﬁrms over time. The AT-score, on the other
hand, varies greatly between ﬁrms, but is close to constant for most ﬁrms over the sample
period.
To allow the between-ﬁrm eﬀects to diﬀer from the within-ﬁrm eﬀects, we decompose
every right hand side variable from eq. (8) into a ﬁrm-ﬁxed component (the average value for
each ﬁrm — denoted by ∅) and the ﬁrm-change component (the period-to-period ﬂuctuations
around the ﬁrm average — denoted by ∆), as explained in Gould (2001):
incentivesit = ψ
∅
1 BBO
∅
i + ψ
∅
2 D(t ≥ 0)
∅
i +
k X
j=1
α
∅
j X
∅
ji
+ ψ
∆
1 BBO
∆
it + ψ
∆
2 D(t ≥ 0)
∆
t +
k X
j=1
α
∆
j X
∆
jit + υi + it . (9)
To account for the increase in the cost of overstatements from SOX, we allow the eﬀect of
the board beneﬁt measures to vary from before to after SOX by interacting them with pre-
and post-SOX dummies. We estimate the regression using the random-eﬀects estimator.
∅-coeﬃcients equal the coeﬃcients that would be estimated using the between estimator;
the ∆-coeﬃcients equal the coeﬃcients that would be estimated using the ﬁxed-eﬀects
estimator. D(t ≥ 0)
∅
i gets dropped from the regression, because it does not vary between
ﬁrms (due to our requirement of no entry into and exit from the sample). Again, we estimate
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and account for clustering at the ﬁrm-period level.
We run six versions of regression (9): two measures for CEO incentives (log(PPS) and
PPS-ratio) times three measures of board beneﬁts. The results are displayed in Table VII.
In all six cases, we obtain a positive and statistically signiﬁcant estimate of the eﬀect of
25board beneﬁts on CEO incentives in the cross-section before SOX. We also ﬁnd that the
cross-sectional link between board beneﬁts and CEO incentives weakens after SOX. The p-
value for ∆sox conﬁrms our conjecture that ψ
∅
1 is indeed smaller after SOX than before SOX.
In contrast to the strong cross-sectional results, we ﬁnd a substantially weaker relationship
between within-ﬁrm variation in the KZ-score and CEO incentives, and no link for the AT-
and IT-scores. This ﬁnding is not unexpected, given the between- and within-variation in
the BBO-scores discussed previously.
[Insert Table VII here.]
To compare the economic magnitudes across the diﬀerent measures of board beneﬁts
from overstatements, we evaluate the percentage diﬀerence in expected CEO incentives for
moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the pooled cross-sectional distribution of the
BBO measures. The interquartile ranges (∆iqBBO) are 1.06 for the KZ-score, 4 for the
AT-score, and 0.30 for the IT-score. The percentage change in CEO incentives is then given
by exp(c ψ
∅
1 ×∆iqBBO). We obtain KZ-, AT-, and IT-eﬀects of 34%, 15%, and 18% on PPS,
which translate into diﬀerences between $201,000–$464,000 per 1% increase in ﬁrm value at
the mean of pre-SOX PPS, and $41,000–$95,000 at the median of pre-SOX PPS.
Our ﬁndings on the cross-sectional relationships between proxies for BBO and PPS
are consistent with contemporaneous work on executive compensation: Wang (2008) ﬁnds
that CEO pay-for-performance sensitivities are higher in ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms than
in unconstrained ﬁrms; Fahlenbrach (2008) shows that CEO incentives decrease with the
number of anti-takeover provisions; and Shin (2008) documents that short-term institutional
ownership is associated with higher option compensation.
To summarize, we show that cross-sectional variation in board beneﬁts from overstate-
ments is reﬂected in cross-sectional variation in CEO incentives. We also document that the
cross-sectional link between board beneﬁts and CEO incentives is stronger before SOX than
26after SOX. These ﬁndings suggest that board objectives vary cross-sectionally with board
beneﬁts from overstatements.
C.3. The Change in CEO Incentives Around SOX: The Eﬀect of Board Beneﬁts from
Overstatements
In the preceding section we show that our measures of board beneﬁts of overstatements are
consistent with the model’s prediction about the eﬀect of board preferences λ in the cross-
section. In this section we go one step further and test if, within ﬁrms, incentives also fall
by more around SOX in ﬁrms with high board beneﬁts, as stated in hypothesis (3). To that
end, we run the regression
incentivesit = φ1 BBOit + φ2 D(t ≥ 0)t × D(BBO|t < 0)i + φ3 D(t ≥ 0)t
+ α0 +
k X
j=1
αjXjit + υi + it , (10)
where D(t ≥ 0)t is a dummy set to one for ﬁscal years 2002–2005 and D(BBO|t < 0)i
is a dummy that indicates high board beneﬁts from overstatements in the period before
SOX. In particular, for the time-varying KZ- and IT-scores, we average the score over the
three-year pre-SOX period for each ﬁrm. We consider the upper half of the distribution to
have high BBO (D(BBO|t < 0)i = 1). The AT-score has negligible variation over time,
and we have observations for ﬁscal years 2000, 2002, and 2004 only. The 2002 observations
became available from IRRC in February 2002, so we use those AT-scores for determining
D(BBO|t < 0)i. While separating the BBO groups at the median is coarse, it is transparent
and easily interpretable.15 Thus, φ2 is the coeﬃcient of interest. A negative estimate
of φ2 would indicate that incentives fall by more in ﬁrms with high board beneﬁts from
15The results remain qualitatively unchanged if we use continuous pre-SOX averages of the proxies for board
beneﬁts instead of their dummy versions.
27overstatements before SOX.16 To control for the possibility that the within-ﬁrm change in
incentives is driven by the within-ﬁrm change in board beneﬁts from overstatements over
time, we also include the time-varying continuous measure of board beneﬁts in the regression.
Xjit contains the same standard determinants of CEO incentives as regression (6). As before,
υi are ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. We estimate heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by
ﬁrm-period.
The results are displayed in Table VIII. The coeﬃcients are directly comparable across
BBO measures for the same measure of incentives, because the interaction term uses a
dummy for BBO. Our estimates are remarkably similar across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that log(PPS) falls by 0.122–0.145 more in ﬁrms with high pre-SOX
board beneﬁts than in ﬁrms with low pre-SOX board beneﬁts. Translating these estimates
into dollar ﬁgures yields an additional decrease in PPS for high BBO ﬁrms between $162,000
and $190,000 at the mean level of pre-SOX PPS, and between $31,000 and $36,000 at the
median level of PPS. The results for the PPS-ratio are similar. All interaction terms, except
for one, are signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level or better.
[Insert Table VIII here.]
It is worth noting that, when measuring CEO incentives with log(PPS), the coeﬃcient for
the post-SOX dummy loses its statistical signiﬁcance and much of its economic magnitude
compared to the speciﬁcations in Table IV. This ﬁnding suggests that the decrease in stock-
and option-based incentives around SOX is fully concentrated in ﬁrms with high beneﬁts
from overstatements prior to SOX: only boards with high beneﬁts from overstatements value
market performance. When measuring CEO incentives with the PPS-ratio, however, the
post-SOX dummy remains negative with sizable magnitude in all regressions. This ﬁnding
16Here we allow the average within-ﬁrm response of CEO incentives to SOX to vary cross-sectionally. The ﬁxed
eﬀects estimator identiﬁes φ2, because the time-invariant board beneﬁts variable is interacted with the time-varying
post-SOX dummy.
28suggests that all ﬁrms — with and without beneﬁts from overstatements — increase the
relative importance of salary and bonus pay around SOX.
The evidence in Table VIII is arguably stronger than the evidence presented in Table IV.
While signiﬁcant changes in PPS coincide with SOX, the estimated SOX eﬀect potentially
reﬂects other events or changes in market conditions. The results in Table VIII implic-
itly control for such confounding eﬀects, because we compare the change in PPS around
SOX between ﬁrms with high and low board beneﬁts from overstatements. Through this
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach we are able to rule out alternative explanations that aﬀect
the two groups equally. For example, heterogeneity in investors’ beliefs about the extent
of overstatements may have decreased with the revelation of more and more accounting
scandals. Growing media and social pressure on restraining skyrocketing CEO pay, especially
in the form of stock options, may have also led to the change in the structure of CEO
compensation.
C.4. Contemporaneous Changes in NYSE/NASDAQ Listing Requirements
Contemporaneous to SOX, NYSE and NASDAQ were in the process of revising their listing
requirements. The goal of these reforms was to improve the quality of corporate governance
by increasing the independence of corporate boards and their committees. In particular, the
new listing requirements on the NYSE and NASDAQ require each board to have a majority
of independent directors, as well as fully independent compensation and audit committees.
The new NYSE and NASDAQ rules became eﬀective with a company’s ﬁrst annual meeting
occurring after January 15, 2004, but no later than October 31, 2004. For the majority of
ﬁrms, the new requirements became binding for ﬁscal year 2003 reports.
We use board data provided by Riskmetrics to determine ﬁrms’ compliance status. We
match the Riskmetrics observation to the ﬁscal year into which the board meeting date falls.
We classify boards as compliant or non-compliant based on their board independence in ﬁscal
29year 2002, the year prior to the rule change. Following Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2008),
we reclassify directors as independent when their employment relationship terminated three
or more years ago to reconcile the diﬀerences in how Riskmetrics and the NYSE/NASDAQ
listing standards deﬁne independence. Of our 857 sample ﬁrms, we classify 138 as non-
compliant, and lack board data for 77.
The new listing requirements had a noticeable impact on board independence. The
change in board independence is evident in Table II, panel A. Firms that were failing
the new director independence standards in the year prior to those rules going into eﬀect,
improved their governance drastically over the following years. In the non-compliant ﬁrms,
only 42% of directors were independent before the new rules, but independence increased by
10 percentage points within one year and by 20 percentage points by 2005. On the other
hand, ﬁrms that already met the requirements show an increase of only 3 percentage points
from 2002 to 2005. The fraction of compliant boards in our sample jumps from 82% in 2002
to 93% in 2004.
We allow the eﬀect of SOX on CEO incentives to diﬀer between compliant and non-
compliant ﬁrms by estimating regression (6) separately for compliers and non-compliers.
Table IX displays the results. CEO incentives decrease in compliant ﬁrms, which suggests
that even independent boards emphasize market values over fundamental values. Thus, we
should not expect independent boards to be eﬀective monitors of overstatements.
[Insert Table IX here.]
The economic magnitude of the change in CEO incentives, however, is much larger for
non-compliers: fourfold for log(PPS) and double for PPS-ratio. The diﬀerence between the
SOX eﬀects is statistically signiﬁcant at the 4.1% signiﬁcance level for log(PPS), and at the
9.4% level for the PPS-ratio.
30There are at least three possible explanations for this ﬁnding. First, non-compliant boards
have larger equity stakes in their ﬁrms: the median pre-SOX voting power of compliant
boards is only 1.3%, but 12.1% in non-compliant ﬁrms. To the extent that overstatements
are beneﬁcial to the owners of the ﬁrm, larger equity stakes translate into higher incentives for
overstatements. Second, the decrease in CEO incentives in non-compliant ﬁrms is consistent
with the view that oversight and incentive pay are substitutes (Holmstr¨ om (1979)). The
large decrease could thus reﬂect not just the change in the cost of overstatement, but also
the improvement in the quality of corporate governance. Third, as suggested by Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2001), non-independent boards may not have been setting or enforcing
optimal incentive contracts. Therefore, the large decrease in CEO incentives could also be
attributable to a regime shift from managerial skimming to optimal contracting.
Given the variety of possible interpretations of the larger decrease in CEO incentives in
non-compliant ﬁrms compared to compliant ﬁrms, it is diﬃcult to make any predictions about
the interactions of non-compliance with the proxies for board beneﬁts in testing hypotheses
(2) and (3). Therefore, we replicate those tests for the subsample of ﬁrms in compliance with
the new board independence requirement in ﬁscal year 2002. The results remain qualitatively,
and in most cases even quantitatively, unchanged. We conclude that our ﬁndings are not
attributable to the contemporaneous changes in board characteristics.
[Insert Table X here.]
[Insert Table XI here.]
III. Conclusion
Recent corporate governance reforms have put great emphasis on board independence to
improve the quality of ﬁnancial reporting. However, the role boards play in monitoring
31earnings overstatements is not yet well understood. In one view, managers seek to inﬂate
the stock price for private beneﬁts and corporate boards act as monitors to limit earnings
overstatements. In the other view, boards themselves value overstatements and set incentive
contracts to reward overstatements.
To distinguish between these two competing views on board objectives, we propose a
principal-agent model linking optimal incentives to the cost of earnings overstatements. A
board acting as a monitor should raise incentives following an increase in the agent’s cost of
overstatements to induce more productive eﬀort. However, a board maximizing the market
value of a ﬁrm should decrease incentives to reduce the cost of induced overstatements.
The model enables us to infer board objectives without relying on contentious measures of
earnings management.
In addition, the model oﬀers two predictions that allow us to test whether empirical
proxies for board beneﬁts from overstatements are reﬂected in incentive contracts. First,
boards with greater beneﬁts from overstatements should oﬀer higher incentives to their
CEOs. Second, the more boards value overstatements, the greater should be the eﬀect of
SOX on PPS.
Our two approaches — inferring board objectives and proxying for board objectives
— yield results that are consistent with each other. We ﬁnd that boards of large public
companies in the U.S. respond to the increase in the cost of earnings overstatements imposed
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 by reducing CEO incentives. From this we can infer that
boards must value overstatements.
Using three proxies for board beneﬁts from overstatements (capital constraints, anti-
takeover provisions, and portfolio turnover rates of institutional blockholders), we document
a positive relationship between board beneﬁts and CEO incentives. We also ﬁnd that the
decrease in CEO incentives is concentrated in ﬁrms whose boards beneﬁt from overstate-
32ments. These results indicate that CEO incentives reﬂect boards’ beneﬁts and CEOs’ costs
from overstatements.
We conclude that corporate boards face a conﬂict of interest in their role as monitors of
overstatements, and thus cannot be expected to eﬀectively prevent overstatements.
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38Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) From (5),
∂β∗
∂km
=
1 − λ(1 − θ)(1 + r(σ2
m + σ2
))
(km + kmr(σ2
m + σ2
) + 1)
2 > 0 (A-1)
⇐⇒ λ <
1
(1 − θ)(1 + r(σ2
m + σ2
))
.
Since λ < 1,
∂β∗
∂km is always positive if 1
(1−θ)(1+r(σ2
m+σ2
)) ≥ 1, that is, if
θ ≥
r(σ2
m+σ2
)
1+r(σ2
m+σ2
).
(ii) If θ ≥
r(σ2
m+σ2
)
1+r(σ2
m+σ2
), however,
∂β∗
∂km < 0 if and only if λ > 1
(1−θ)(1+r(σ2
m+σ2
)).
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) From (5), it is straightforward to show that
∂β∗
∂λ
=
1−θ
km
1 + 1
km + r(σ2
m + σ2
)
> 0 . (A-2)
(ii) From (A-1),
∂2β∗
∂λ∂km
= −
(1 − θ)(1 + r(σ2
m + σ2
))
(km + kmr(σ2
m + σ2
) + 1)
2 < 0 . (A-3)
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Details on Calculating PPS
We construct the incentive measure following Core and Guay (2002). In particular, we
compute the dollar change in executives’ stock- and option holdings for a hypothetical one
percent change in ﬁrm value (we call this variable pay-for-performance sensitivity [PPS]).
We separately calculate PPS for newly granted options, previously granted exercisable and
unexercisable options, and stock holdings. Measuring PPS requires six inputs: the risk-
free rate, stock price volatility, dividend yield, time to maturity, stock price, and number
of options granted or held. All variables except for the risk-free rate can be obtained from
Execucomp, either directly (e.g. dividend yield and volatility, stock price) or indirectly (time-
to-maturity, number of options held).
Following the Execucomp convention in calculating option grant values, we winsorize
volatility and dividend yields within each ﬁscal year. The largest and smallest values are
least likely to be good representations of expectations about their future values. We replace
missing values of the 3-year average dividend yield (bs yield) with current dividend yields,
missing values for volatility (bs volat) with the Execucomp sample mean, and missing values
for exercise price (expric) with either the market price (mktpric) or the average of the ﬁscal-
year-end closing price (prccf ) and the closing price discounted by total shareholder returns
that year (trs1yr). We also observe that ﬁrms who make only one grant to an executive
within a ﬁscal year often only report the total number of options granted (soptgrnt), but not
the number of options in that grant (numsecur). We estimate maturity to be the diﬀerence
between exercise date and grant date. Missing values are assumed to be 10 years. Some
maturities are computed to be 0 years, so we replace those with 1 year. We also value
the options at the end of the ﬁscal year, not at the time of the grant to make all values
comparable and current at ﬁscal year end. Finally, we weight the individual grants’ deltas
40by the grant values to each executive within each year to compute PPS from new option
grants for each executive-ﬁrm-year.
Estimating the inputs for previous grants is harder. Information on the characteristics
of past option grants is not available. For example, the number and value of unexercisable
options are available, but we do not know the composition of the unexercisable options
from previous grants. Similarly, for exercisable options, we do not know which previously
granted options were exercised by the executives and which ones were kept in the portfolio.
However, Core and Guay’s main contribution lies in showing that imputing the missing
characteristics yields a very close approximation to hand-collected, full-information option
portfolios. Unfortunately, the documentation in Core and Guay does not allow us to replicate
their imputation strategy directly. We encounter a number of problems. For example, the
reported value of (un)exercisable options pertains only to in-the-money options, but the
number of (un)exercisable options also includes out-of-the-money options. Furthermore,
adjusting the value and number of unexercisable options for current year option grants
imply that about half of our observations would end up with negative values. We assume
that the reported number of unexercisable options held includes newly granted options,
unless the number of options granted exceeds the holdings. Similar to our approach for
newly granted options, we estimate the exercise price for previously granted options by
appropriately discounting the adjusted ﬁscal-year end stock price by total shareholder returns
(trs3yr). The maturity of unexercisable options is assumed to be one year less than the
maturity of any option grant in the previous year, or 9 years if no options were granted in
the previous year. The maturity of exercisable options is assumed to be 3 years less than
that of unexercisable options.
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42Table II: Summary Statistics on CEO and Firm Characteristics
Our sample covers large publicly traded ﬁrms with ﬁscal years 1999–2005. We require annual data on CEO incentives
(from Execucomp) and ﬁrm characteristics (from Compustat). To avoid entry and exit eﬀects, we only keep ﬁrms
with CEO incentive data for all seven years of the sample. However, our results are qualitatively unchanged if we
relax this restriction. Table II, panel A, displays the means of all variables for each ﬁscal year. We consider ﬁscal
years 1999-2001 as pre-SOX and ﬁscal years 2003-2005 as post-SOX. It is a priori unclear how ﬁscal year 2002 is
aﬀected by SOX, so we treat it as a transition year. Panel B provides further summary statistics for the pooled
cross-section.
Panel A: Means by Fiscal Year
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
PPS ($ thsd.) 2,690 2,013 1,659 1,333 1,569 1,687 1,635
PPS-ratio 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.24
equity-ratio 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.45 0.41 0.42 0.42
market value ($ mill.) 9,765 10,708 9,099 7,089 8,736 9,356 9,439
return volatility 0.40 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.45 0.39
market-to-book ratio 2.86 2.33 1.96 1.63 1.88 1.90 1.87
leverage 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22
return on assets 0.05 0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04
shareholder return 0.30 0.21 0.07 -0.12 0.44 0.17 0.07
market return 0.22 -0.09 -0.15 -0.22 0.27 0.10 0.05
CEO tenure 8.53 8.39 8.05 8.17 8.13 8.52 8.20
option exercise ratio 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.16 0.17
CEO turnover 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.13
KZ-score 1.12 1.06 0.80 0.60 0.66 0.59 0.54
AT-score . 8.82 . 8.62 . 8.58 .
IT-score 0.82 0.88 0.76 0.71 0.63 0.64 0.71
compliant boards 0.77 0.79 0.80 0.82 0.88 0.93 0.95
board independence - compliers 0.70 0.72 0.73 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.78
board independence - noncompliers 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.52 0.60 0.62
Panel B: Summary Statistics
25th %ile 50th %ile 75th %ile mean st dev # obs
PPS ($ thsd.) 102 294 790 1,798 17,001 6153
PPS-ratio 0.09 0.18 0.34 0.26 0.24 6153
equity-ratio 0.19 0.46 0.67 0.43 0.29 6106
market value ($ mill.) 650 1,786 6,209 9,170 27,557 6152
return volatility 0.30 0.39 0.55 0.45 0.22 5913
market-to-book ratio 1.12 1.45 2.19 2.06 2.57 6150
leverage 0.08 0.23 0.35 0.24 0.19 6137
return on assets 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.18 6152
shareholder return -0.16 0.07 0.32 0.16 0.67 6131
market return -0.14 0.04 0.22 0.03 0.18 6146
CEO tenure 3.00 6.00 11.00 8.28 7.58 5891
option exercise ratio 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.15 0.26 6152
CEO turnover 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.32 6054
KZ-score 0.16 0.65 1.22 0.77 1.62 5721
AT-score 7.00 9.00 11.00 8.67 2.59 2408
IT-score 0.56 0.69 0.86 0.73 0.31 4702
43Table III: The Change in Incentives Around SOX — Year Dummies
In this table, we document that CEO incentives decrease around the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was signed
into law on 7/25/2002. We deﬁne 2002 as the transition year, as SOX falls into ﬁscal year 2002 for most companies.
Fiscal years 1999–2001 are considered pre-SOX and ﬁscal years 2003–2005 are considered post-SOX. The year dummies
are deﬁned to capture the marginal eﬀect of each year on the level of incentives and incentive pay (i.e. each year
dummy captures the change from the previous year). Our measures of the level of CEO incentives are the dollar
change in CEOs’ stock and option holdings from a hypothetical 1% increase in ﬁrm value (PPS) in column (i); and
the fraction of income derived from PPS relative to the sum of PPS, salary, and bonus (PPS-ratio) in column (ii).
As a robustness check, we also look at the fraction of stock and option grants of total pay (equity-ratio) in column
(iii), which captures the ﬂow of incentives. Two-sided p-values — based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
clustered at the ﬁrm level — are in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote signiﬁcant diﬀerences from zero at the 1%,
5%, and 10% conﬁdence levels.
log(PPS) PPS-ratio equity-ratio
2000 (pre-SOX) 0.123*** 0.033*** 0.033*
(0.007) (0.001) (0.089)
2001 (pre-SOX) 0.026 0.003 0.046***
(0.314) (0.533) (0.000)
2002 (transition year) -0.042* -0.018*** -0.046***
(0.083) (0.000) (0.000)
2003 (post-SOX) -0.197*** -0.038*** -0.055**
(0.001) (0.005) (0.041)
2004 (post-SOX) 0.047* -0.005 0.000
(0.078) (0.367) (0.988)
2005 (post-SOX) 0.016 0.000 -0.007
(0.565) (0.989) (0.489)
market value (log) 0.920*** 0.067*** 0.064***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
return volatility (log) 0.168 0.001 -0.015
(0.114) (0.957) (0.572)
market-to-book ratio (log) 0.210* 0.104*** 0.019
(0.053) (0.000) (0.386)
leverage -0.129 -0.002 -0.009
(0.262) (0.936) (0.841)
return on assets (log) 0.019 -0.038* -0.062*
(0.862) (0.054) (0.062)
shareholder return (log) 0.184*** -0.009** -0.043***
(0.000) (0.042) (0.000)
market return (log) 0.296*** 0.070*** 0.049
(0.010) (0.007) (0.341)
CEO tenure (log) 0.442*** 0.068*** -0.054***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
option exercise ratio -0.185*** -0.034*** 0.029**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.040)
CEO turnover (dummy) 0.061 0.045*** 0.017
(0.167) (0.000) (0.270)
# of observations 5,549 5,549 5,511
# of ﬁrms 857 857 856
within-R
2 0.538 0.285 0.069
44Table IV: The Change in Incentives Around SOX — Post-SOX Dummy
In this table, we simplify our regressions from Table III by replacing the year dummies with a single dummy variable
to diﬀerentiate between pre- and post-SOX years. We use this speciﬁcation for ease of interpretation of our subsequent
results. In the ﬁrst two columns, we deﬁne ﬁscal years 2002 and later to be post-SOX. We choose to count ﬁscal
year 2002 toward post-SOX, because the downward adjustment in CEO incentives becomes evident in ﬁscal year
2002, as shown in Table III. In columns 3 and 4, we document that our ﬁnding is robust to an alternative deﬁnition
of the post-SOX period. There, the post-SOX period includes all ﬁscal years that begin on or after 8/1/2002 (i.e.
the ﬁrst month after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law on 7/25/2002). Two-sided p-values — based on
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm-period level — are in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗
denote signiﬁcant diﬀerences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% conﬁdence levels.
ﬁscal year ≥ 2002 ﬁscal year begins ≥ 8/1/2002
log(PPS) PPS-ratio log(PPS) PPS-ratio
post-SOX (dummy) -0.083*** -0.032*** -0.082*** -0.036***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
market value (log) 0.919*** 0.065*** 0.923*** 0.068***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
return volatility (log) 0.197*** 0.024* 0.174*** 0.015
(0.004) (0.092) (0.010) (0.297)
market-to-book ratio (log) 0.212** 0.104*** 0.225*** 0.105***
(0.012) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000)
leverage -0.130 -0.001 -0.118 0.002
(0.176) (0.955) (0.219) (0.938)
return on assets (log) 0.022 -0.039** 0.027 -0.038**
(0.816) (0.026) (0.776) (0.043)
shareholder return (log) 0.184*** -0.008** 0.184*** -0.007*
(0.000) (0.046) (0.000) (0.073)
market return (log) -0.068* -0.009 0.019 0.032***
(0.061) (0.217) (0.710) (0.001)
CEO tenure (log) 0.443*** 0.069*** 0.443*** 0.069***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
option exercise ratio -0.186*** -0.035*** -0.187*** -0.035***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO turnover (dummy) 0.061 0.044*** 0.066* 0.046***
(0.137) (0.000) (0.099) (0.000)
# of observations 5,549 5,549 5,549 5,549
# of ﬁrms 857 857 857 857
within-R
2 0.537 0.280 0.536 0.278
45Table V: The Change in Incentives Around SOX — Median Regression
In Tables III and IV, we report results from ﬁrm-ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions that estimate the mean change in CEO
incentives from before to after SOX. To ensure that our results are representative of the typical ﬁrm in the sample
(instead of being driven by large changes in a few ﬁrms), we also estimate median regressions. We purge ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀects by demeaning all variables. In columns 1 and 2, the post-SOX period includes ﬁscal years 2002 and later. In
columns 3 and 4, the post-SOX period includes all ﬁscal years that begin on or after 8/1/2002. Two-sided p-values
are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote signiﬁcant diﬀerences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% conﬁdence levels.
ﬁscal year ≥ 2002 ﬁscal year begins ≥ 8/1/2002
log(PPS) PPS-ratio log(PPS) PPS-ratio
post-SOX (dummy) -0.080*** -0.020*** -0.084*** -0.022***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
market value (log) 0.884*** 0.062*** 0.889*** 0.063***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
return volatility (log) 0.054* 0.014* 0.026 0.009
(0.074) (0.063) (0.445) (0.119)
market-to-book ratio (log) 0.302*** 0.088*** 0.316*** 0.089***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
leverage -0.048 -0.002 -0.029 -0.003
(0.408) (0.889) (0.650) (0.778)
return on assets (log) 0.041 -0.073*** 0.050 -0.066***
(0.362) (0.000) (0.303) (0.000)
shareholder return (log) 0.121*** -0.003 0.127*** -0.002
(0.000) (0.372) (0.000) (0.514)
market return (log) -0.031 0.004 0.053 0.029***
(0.265) (0.581) (0.149) (0.000)
CEO tenure (log) 0.386*** 0.042*** 0.383*** 0.041***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
option exercise ratio -0.137*** -0.028*** -0.141*** -0.029***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO turnover (dummy) 0.014 0.017*** 0.022 0.017***
(0.487) (0.001) (0.334) (0.000)
# of observations 5,549 5,549 5,549 5,549
# of ﬁrms 857 857 857 857
Pseudo-R
2 0.394 0.162 0.393 0.160
46Table VI: The Changing Link between CEO Pay and Firm Performance
Our ﬁrst measure of the level of CEO incentives — log(PPS) — has the potential drawback that it does not include
CEOs’ bonus compensation, which can also be tied to ﬁrm performance. Although our second measure of CEO
incentives — PPS-ratio — does include bonuses, it assumes that bonuses provide CEOs with fewer incentives to
overstate performance than stock- and option holdings. To rule out the possibility that CEO incentives shifted from
PPS to bonus pay around SOX without aﬀecting the link between total CEO pay and ﬁrm performance, we take
an alternative approach oﬀered in the prior literature on CEO pay. To this end, we regress CEO pay (in $ mill.)
on two measures of ﬁrm performance: return on assets and ﬁrm stock returns. We also interact the performance
measures with the post-SOX dummy to allow for changes in the performance sensitivity of CEO pay. In column 1,
we only consider bonuses. In column 2, we consider total CEO pay, which includes both the ﬂow of compensation
(e.g. stock and option grants, salary, and bonus) as well as changes in the value of CEOs’ stock- and option holdings.
Two-sided p-values — based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm-period level — are in
parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote signiﬁcant diﬀerences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% conﬁdence levels.
Bonus Pay Total Pay
post-SOX (dummy) 0.166*** 0.994
(0.000) (0.500)
market value (log) 0.326*** -1.470
(0.000) (0.625)
return volatility (log) -0.231*** -15.634***
(0.002) (0.001)
market-to-book ratio (log) -0.257*** 32.388***
(0.000) (0.000)
leverage 0.008 17.393
(0.939) (0.157)
return on assets (log) 0.990*** -31.517
(0.000) (0.204)
return on assets × post-SOX -0.450** 1.351
(0.032) (0.952)
shareholder return (log) 0.139*** 65.414***
(0.000) (0.000)
shareholder return (log) × post-SOX 0.127*** -29.929***
(0.009) (0.000)
market return (log) -0.072 19.384**
(0.441) (0.012)
market return (log) × post-SOX -0.016 -1.614
(0.889) (0.860)
CEO tenure (log) 0.031 4.393***
(0.277) (0.000)
option exercise ratio 0.058 -1.024
(0.173) (0.694)
CEO turnover (dummy) -0.031 3.710*
(0.497) (0.068)
# of observations 5,549 5,361
# of ﬁrms 857 857
within-R
2 0.103 0.232
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49Table IX: The Change in Incentives Around SOX: The Eﬀect of Non-Compliance with
the New NYSE/NASDAQ Listing Requirements
This table replicates the tests reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table IV, except that we run the regressions separately for
ﬁrms whose boards of directors were compliant and non-compliant with the new NYSE/NASDAQ listing requirements
for board independence. We determine compliance status in ﬁscal year 2002, which for most ﬁrms is the year
preceding the announcement of the new governance standards. CEO incentives decreased even in compliant ﬁrms,
although by a smaller magnitude than in non-compliant ﬁrms, indicating that our results are fully attributable to the
contemporaneous changes in governance. Two-sided p-values — based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
clustered at the ﬁrm-period level — are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote signiﬁcant diﬀerences from zero at the
1%, 5%, and 10% conﬁdence levels.
log(PPS) PPS-ratio
compliant non-compliant compliant non-compliant
post-SOX (dummy) -0.052*** -0.206*** -0.027*** -0.045***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
market value (log) 0.923*** 0.925*** 0.079*** 0.039**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.028)
return volatility (log) 0.127** 0.710*** 0.029** 0.090**
(0.033) (0.004) (0.015) (0.013)
market-to-book ratio (log) 0.254*** -0.061 0.090*** 0.154***
(0.000) (0.885) (0.000) (0.000)
leverage -0.110 -0.391 -0.035 -0.068
(0.322) (0.222) (0.164) (0.175)
return on assets (log) 0.059 0.113 -0.045* 0.006
(0.536) (0.696) (0.081) (0.872)
shareholder return (log) 0.223*** 0.173* -0.007 -0.013
(0.000) (0.072) (0.111) (0.244)
market return (log) -0.081** -0.021 -0.011 0.008
(0.030) (0.824) (0.115) (0.737)
CEO tenure (log) 0.400*** 0.665*** 0.057*** 0.112***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
option exercise ratio -0.180*** -0.299** -0.041*** -0.027
(0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (0.168)
CEO turnover (dummy) 0.007 0.244** 0.033*** 0.070***
(0.877) (0.050) (0.000) (0.001)
# of observations 4,218 853 4,218 853
# of ﬁrms 642 138 642 138
within-R
2 0.551 0.450 0.268 0.399
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